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INTRODUCTION

It is hard to jumpstart a wetland. Nevertheless, each day many developers promise to do just that. Moreover, many who promise wetlands creation or protection enhancement breach these promises each
day, often without personal, negative consequences to the breaching
party. The problem of the dead or dying wetland is merely one example of the enforcement problem in the arena of promises made to benefit the public interest. Many such promises can be found in agency
permits of all kinds. The example of the wetland provides an apt vehicle for exploration of the problems inherent in such contracts.
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The public values provided by wetlands is enormous, even when the
title to the wetland area is held in private hands. Wetlands provide
habitat for fish and wildlife, including endangered species, flood control, remediation of chemical contamination, groundwater recharge,
and other benefits that serve the public good.' At the time the developer seeks a permit from the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, optimism prevails. Topographical charts filed with the permit application
show the elevation of the site. An artist's rendering envisions the end
result, sometimes complete with drawings of the plants that promise
to nurture the ecology of the area. Despite the well-laid plans, however, something often goes wrong. The developer fails to remove a
levy as promised, in its permit on file with the U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers. He may fail to flood the area, or to order the contouring
of the designated area, or to pay the nursery for the plants. He may
fail to plant the vegetation necessary to establish the wetlands, or to
monitor or water the plantings. Or he may fail to invest sufficient
funding to perform any of the foregoing activities fully. After the wetland fails, regret replaces optimism as the dominant theme. The anticipated rains do not fall. The seedlings do not sprout. The birds do not
nest. Realism emerges in the scenario; everyone notes that the task of
wetland creation is more difficult than expected. The reality of the
difficulty of making a wetland from a dry land area becomes clear,
repeatedly and predictably, after the original wetland is lost to development and the replacement wetland fails.2 The commons is depleted. Moreover, enforcement of the promise to start a wetland to
benefit the public interest often never occurs.3 It is rarely the object
of a suit or other action to enforce the promise because concerned
parties lack resources to pursue a legal remedy or the court determines that they lack standing to seek redress for the public. No one
requires redress of the broken promise.
The common law may be ill-suited to address breach of a promise to
protect the public commons or the public good. Because of its tradi1. See, e.g., Alyson C. Flournoy, Section 404 at Thirty-Something: A Program in
Search of a Policy, 55 ALA. L. REV. 607, 636 (2004) (noting the value of wetlands to
"fish and wildlife habitat, essential breeding and nursery areas for many species including economically-important shellfish, and habitat and food for migrating birds;
water supply protection through recharge; water quality protection through purification; flood control; erosion and shoreline protection by binding stream banks and
absorbing wave energy; outdoor recreation opportunities for hunters and bird and
wildlife watchers," and other values).
2. The most dramatic example of waste and failure may be the Florida Everglades Restoration Plan. See W. Hodding Carter, Editorial, A Wetland Dying of
Thirst, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 2004, at A23 (asserting that the federal Everglades Restoration Plan will cost billions and will not stop the disappearance of America's largest
wetland).
3. See, e.g., United States v. Krilich, 209 F.3d 968, 969, 973 (7th Cir. 2000) (finding that the district court had subject matter jurisdiction of a case in which the EPA
imposed $1.2 million fine on developer who failed to construct new wetlands within
stated time of consent decree with the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)).
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tional focus on resolving disputes between individual parties enforcing
specific rights, the common law has not developed effective techniques for dealing with the effects of the contract or its breach on
third parties or the public. When changes in technology or society
lead to massive third-party effects like pollution, global warming, loss
of public lands, or destruction of the commons such as wilderness and
wetlands, the common law has been unable to secure the benefits contracted for on behalf of the public.
Neither tort law, nor contract law seems particularly adept at addressing such problems. Courts, legislators, and the public have
deemed the common law inadequate as a tool for protecting promises
of public benefit, and for protecting the public and the environment
from environmental hazards. 4 In part as a result of this perceived failure, legislators have developed protections for public values.5 Federal
and state laws empower agencies to create contractual conditions in
permits that allow use of the public commons as a wetland area. Review of the development of statutory protections represented by environmental laws suggests, however, that statutory protections, as
currently configured, also fail in large part to protect public expectations in promises for the public good. One of the legal mechanisms
employed as a way of protecting the public commons is the inclusion
of contractual commitments by developers and others using the commons. The developer seeking a permit often promises to mitigate
harm and, additionally, to undertake affirmative duties to enhance a
public resource. Thus, the individual who gains the use of public resources often must promise to preserve the commons and protect the
public interest. Such promises made by developers and polluters to
statutorily created representatives of the public commons often meet
the same end-breach and failed enforcement.
Enforcement is a necessary adjunct of any legal right. Without enforcement, law is merely symbolic; the unenforceable right has little
purpose or effect in the real world. Considering the area of contracts
4. See, e.g., City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304 (1981) (restricting district
court to imposing limitations within federal statutory scheme in suit by Illinois against
Milwaukee for sewer discharge into Lake Michigan); Diamond v. Gen. Motors Corp.,
97 Cal. Rptr. 639 (Ct. App. 1971) (affirming dismissal of complaint against 293 corporations and municipalities for air pollution in part on basis of complexity of issues and
multiplicity of parties); see also, e.g., James R. MacAyeal, The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act: The CorrectParadigmof Strict
Liability and the Problem of Individual Causation, 18 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y
217, 217-21 (2000-2001) (noting Congressional view of common law as inadequate to
protect third parties from oil spills); Christopher H. Schroeder, Lost in the Translation: What Environmental Regulation Does That Tort Cannot Duplicate, 41 WASHBURN L.J. 583 (2002).
5. See Kenneth S. Abraham, The Relation Between Civil Liability and Environmental Regulation:An Analytical Overview, 41 WASHBURN L.J. 379, 379 (2002) (finding irony in inadequacy of common law as justification for environmental regulation
because of failures of regulation).
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between private individuals, the law does more than merely declare
that commitments have significance. It gives promises power and encourages contracting behavior by allowing the individuals harmed by a
breach to sue to secure the benefit of the bargain. Thus, contract law
provides for enforcement of bargains by those who have been injured
when a commitment has been broken. In the context of promises
made to the public, such as the promise to establish a wetland, the
issue of enforcement is often unaddressed and unclear. Certainly, the
Army Corps of Engineers has the power to enforce the requirement it
included as a condition of the issuance of a permit. Nevertheless, the
Corps cannot pursue all instances of failure to fulfill such promises.
Despite the statutory provisions giving agencies significant enforcement powers and establishing the right of citizens to bring suit under
nearly every federal environmental act, the ability of citizens to enforce the protections granted by the statute, or by contracts entered
pursuant to the statutes, is questionable. Indeed, modern interpretation of the constitutional requirement of standing often means that
unless the agency that required the promise is willing to enforce it, no
one can do so.
The case of the dying wetlands is explored in this Article merely as
one example of the need for monitoring and enforcing promises to
produce a direct public benefit. Other examples taken from the environmental arena come readily to mind. These include conservation
easements, supplemental environmental projects (SEPs), and environmental protections generally. The Hadley Mill itself is a perfect metaphor, or example. The common law handles with facility the question
of whether Hadley or Pickfords should pay for the down time of the
mill, but it is less effective in dealing with environmental effects, such
as discharges from the Mill, the loss of wetlands because of the construction of the mill in the wetlands, and other environmental harms
caused by the mill or the loss of the wetlands.6
This Article begins an exploration of the possibility of using contract law as a supplement to statutory law that protects the commons.
It examines contractual commitments created by governmental agencies as representatives of the public. Part II relates the economic analysis set forth by Garrett Hardin in his famous article, The Tragedy of
the Commons, and applies this analysis of the cost-benefit ratio that
applies to use of a public good (the commons). It also examines the
similar incentive problems in relying on individual action for enforcement of promises to protect public benefits such as promises to mitigate harm or enhance environmental values. Part III explores the
public purpose of law generally and law that relates specifically to protection of the commons such as wetlands values under the Clean
Water Act. It compares the enforcement mechanism of ordinary con6. See Hadley v. Baxendale, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (Ex. 1854).
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tracts with the enforcement mechanism for promises made to further
a public interest. It also speculates that the greater use of enforcement mechanisms from private contract law may enhance enforcement of promises made to the public, taking as an example the
possibility of a broader use of the third party beneficiary doctrine to
protect the public interest and to supplement the efforts of regulatory
agencies. Part IV concludes that despite significant problems enhanced use of contract provisions may significantly supplement statutory protections of the commons.
II.

THE TRAGEDY OF INDIVIDUAL INCENTIVES

This Part compares the tragedy originally chronicled by Hardin in
the overuse of the commons with the other common tragedies of broken promises to enhance the public good and the failure to enforce
such promises. Before it faced the density of population and heavy
demand on resources that mark the modern era, society seemed to
assume that the resources of the planet were inexhaustible. The advent of the modern industrial world with its burgeoning energy demands and population growth proved that the assumption depended
on circumstances, however. In The Tragedy of the Commons, Garrett
Hardin considered the cost-benefit ratio inherent in use of a public
good (the commons). He demonstrated that destruction of the commons is the inevitable result of rational action by individuals who use
the public commons.7 The analysis of The Tragedy of the Commons
sparked active debate in the area of property law.' It has not been the
subject of significant inquiry or debate in the area of contract analysis,
however, perhaps because of an assumption that property concepts
predominate in the analysis. Scrutiny of Hardin's insights indicates
that they apply with significant force to another type of analysis of the
commons. This analysis considers the issue of express promises to
protect and enhance public values. Such promises are often made by
parties seeking to obtain the right to use public resources. Considering the expectation of the public in performance of these promises and
the incentives against performance and enforcement suggests that
7. See Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 163 Sci. 1234, 1244-45
(1968).
8. See, e.g., Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Of Property and Antiproperty, 102 MICH. L. REV. 1 (2003); James M. Buchanan & Yong J. Yoon, Symmetric Tragedies: Commons and Anticommons, 43 J.L. & ECON. 1 (2000); Reza Dibadj,
Regulatory Givings and the Anticommons, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 1041 (2003); Lee Anne
Fennell, Common Interest Tragedies, 98 Nw. U. L. REV. 907 (2004); Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition from Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621 (1998); Shi-Ling Hsu, A Two-Dimensional Framework
for Analyzing Property Rights Regimes, 36 U.C. DAvis L. REV. 813 (2003); Dan
Hunter, Cyberspace as Place, and the Tragedy of the DigitalAnticommons, 91 CAL. L.
REV. 439, 509-14 (2003).
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Hardin's analysis is relevant in the context of promises to mitigate
harm or enhance the commons.
The partial solution Hardin suggested to the problem of destruction
of the commons was law, the necessary mutual coercion to preserve
the benefit of the commons for society. Obtaining contractual commitments from those who use public resources seems to provide an
antidote to the problem Hardin identified. It is one variety of mutual
coercion. Nevertheless, the incentives of enforcement present a separate problem similar to that originally identified by Hardin. In a system without effective enforcement, it is unlikely that the public will
receive the benefit promised or that the party who breaches his promise to the public will suffer personal negative consequences.
A.

The Tragedy of the Commons

The central conclusion of Hardin's analysis in The Tragedy of the
Commons is that the use of the commons without constraint leads to
destruction of the public benefit of the commons. Using the example
of the commons, a grazing area open to the public for grazing cattle
for individual use, Hardin demonstrated that mutual coercion through
law is a necessity to preserve the benefit of the commons for society.
Hardin's economic analysis demonstrated that this conclusion is inevitable because of the relationship of individual gains from the commons to the fractional individual loss from destruction of the
commons.
As a rational being, each herdsman seeks to maximize his gain. Explicitly or implicitly, more or less consciously, he asks, "What is the
utility to me of adding one more animal to my herd?" This utility
has one negative and one positive component.
1) The positive component is a function of the increment of one
animal. Since the herdsman receives all the proceeds from the
sale of the additional animal, the positive utility is nearly +1.
2) The negative component is a function of the additional overgrazing created by one more animal. Since, however, the effects of overgrazing are shared by all the herdsmen, the
negative utility for any particular decision-making herdsman is
only a fraction of -1.9
Hardin's example of the commons explains the tragic effects of the
divergent interests of the individual and the group when individuals
compete for finite resources. Clearly, the utility of gain from use is
individual while the loss (negative utility) incident to overuse and depletion of the commons is fractional. 10 Benefits flow to the individual,
while the attendant costs flow to all individuals as members of a
9. Hardin, supra note 8, at 1244.
10. In a sense this loss is also individual because the ultimate impact of overuse
falls on each individual in the group that uses the commons. The phenomenon established by Hardin is, nonetheless, an insight into competitive conduct. The loss to each
https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/txwes-lr/vol11/iss2/18
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group. This economic analysis of this "double bind" revealed the inevitable destruction of group benefits by individuals pitted against
each other in the necessarily competitive environment of finite
resources.
Adding together the component partial utilities, the rational herdsman concludes that the only sensible course for him to pursue is to
add another animal to his herd. And another, and another.... But
this is the conclusion reached by each and every rational herdsman
sharing a commons. Therein is the tragedy. Each man is locked
into a system that compels him to increase his herd without limitin a world that is limited. Ruin is the destination toward which all
men rush, each pursuing his own best interest in a society that believes in the freedom of the commons. Freedom in a commons
brings ruin to all.11
Hardin's work explains the need for law in the context of the commons. This need for law, "mutual coercion," is distinct from the need
for law to keep the peace. 1 2 The mutual coercion presented by the
law is necessary to preserve the commons (the public interest) from
inevitable destruction by rational actors maximizing their own individual interest and coincidentally destroying the interest of all members
of society. Recognition of the tension between the individual and the
group is necessary for the survival of the group and each individual
within it. Thus, the destructive effect extends further than the fractional negative utility Hardin noted. The individual's self-interest undermines the group benefit and also undermines the individual's own
survival when the commons is destroyed or depleted.
Waste disposal harms the commons as surely as over use of the
commons, and both types of activities (use of the commons and pollution of the commons) lead to destruction of the common good, the
public interest. Hardin thus applied his ultimate point (that mutual
coercion is necessary to prevent actors from exploiting the commons
to the extent of destruction) to pollution as well as to use of the public
commons. The ratio of individual gain to group loss will result in use
of the commons by polluters to externalize the costs of production
represented by the disposition of waste into the public commons (the
air, water, and soil of the planet). Thus, the individual's self-interest is
self-destructive in the long run. This truth is clear from the interaction
of theory and the physical reality of a world of finite resources. The
destruction of the commons is inevitable if each individual pursues his
individual is long term in comparison with the gain to each herdsman using the

commons.
11. Hardin, supra note 8, at 1244.
12. For a reference to the peace keeping function of the law, see Joseph M. Perillo,
Misreading Oliver Wendell Holmes on Efficient Breach and Tortious Interference, 68
FORDHAM L. REV. 1085, 1092-93 (2000) (noting that the "legal system knows what
economic science does not know: damages and other legal remedies are substitutes
for private warfare").
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own self-interest and that destruction harms the individual himself,
not simply the individual in his role as a member of society because
each individual depends on the physical world for survival. No extended analysis can change this point. Thus, the destructive power of
efficiency and individual enterprise holds more than theoretical significance. Limiting the effects of individual enterprise and individual
striving for competitive advantage in the contest for finite resources is
crucial for the group and the individual. This is the basis for Hardin's
solution of mutual coercion for the benefit of all.
B.

The Common Tragedy of Promises for a Public Benefit

Contracts entered by individuals seeking to utilize a public resource
are common. Agencies such as the EPA and the Army Corps of Engineers enter such contracts on behalf of the public and in the public
interest. Such agreements seem to be a promising mechanism for mutual coercion. Thus, contract law as authorized by statutes for agency
use seems to offer an antidote to overuse and depletion of public resources. By making the commitment to use but not destroy resources,
contracts embedded in permits may restrict the destructive aspects of
individual enterprise. In the very context chosen by Hardin, grazing
on public lands the government has instituted a system of permits to
limit use.13 Nevertheless, the incorporation of contract law to achieve
control and balance in use of the commons may be overly optimistic.
Scrutiny of promises to the public suggests that such contractual commitments offer little protection unless they are accompanied by effective enforcement. Applying the same sort of analysis that Hardin
used to the context of contractual commitments for the public good
reveals a similar incentives problem.
Contractual commitments to the public are common and the tragedies that arise from their breach are common tragedies. The commitment occurs when an individual enters a contract with an agency as
part of his negotiation to use the public commons. Typically he will
need permission from the government to make such use of the commons. Federal, state and local agencies serve as gatekeepers of the
public commons. They grant permits to use or pollute the commons,
allowing such use and pollution only when the private individual seeking to make use of the commons satisfies prerequisites to use.1 4 The
prerequisites may include demonstration of a public benefit from the
13. See George Cameron Coggins & Margaret Lindeberg-Johnson, The Law of
Public Rangeland Management II: The Commons and the Taylor Act, 13 ENVTL. L. 1
(1982).
14. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 401; 33 U.S.C. § 404 (2000) (providing that the Secretary
of the Army "shall cause to be ascertained the amount of tidewater displaced by any
such structure or by any such deposits, and he shall, if he deem it necessary, require
the parties to whom the permission is given to make compensation for such displacement either by excavating in some part of the harbor ... or in any other mode that
may be satisfactory to him").
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use of the commons as well as promises to minimize harm. They often
include promises to provide some separate benefit to the public, such
as creation of a new wetland in a dry land area. In seeking a permit to
fill a wetland, to pollute a river or the air, the individual (whether a
corporation or person) routinely promises to compensate the public
for the harm or use allowed by the permit. For example, permits issued by the Corps routinely include conditions to mitigate harm to the
public commons and additionally compensate the public for the use or
harm by some affirmative duty. The affirmative duty often includes
environmental projects to pay society for the right to make use of the
commons. Thus, the duty may include construction of a new wetland
as payback to the public for the loss of the wetland destroyed for private use. The public agency, in this example, the Corps of Engineers,
stands as trustee for the public, contracting with the individual developer. The developer's "take" or benefit from the contract is the right
to make use of or destroy the commons (the wetlands' values) for his
own benefit. The "take" or benefit to society is the commitment by
the developer to give back wetland values by mitigation of harm and,
additionally, by construction of the new wetland to replace the destroyed wetland.
In contract terms, each party to the deal has some bargained for
benefit. Questions relating to whether the bargain struck is sufficiently protective of the public interest and of the comparative value
of the deal to the individual and society inhere in this situation. This
discussion ignores problems relating to the effectiveness of the representation of the public interest to focus on incentives problems relating to performance by promissor and enforcement by members of the
public. In other words, this discussion assumes that the representative
of the public (in this example, the Army Corps of Engineers) effectively represents the public. It negotiates a good deal for the public in
this exchange. For purposes of analyzing the failure of enforcement,
this inquiry assumes that the representative of the public recognizes
and fully protects the public interest at stake. Part of the bargained
for exchange is the promise to mitigate harm and to compensate society for what was gained by the individual in the bargain. Use of public
resources such as wetlands payback provisions, conservation easements, supplemental environmental projects, and the tragedies that
arise from their breach are common tragedies.
1. Enforcement of Promises for a Public Benefit
Absent effective enforcement, contractual commitments to preserve
the common good are ineffective and, thus, essentially symbolic in nature. Moreover, consideration of the incentives operating on the individual who might consider pursuing enforcement reveals strong
incentives against performance and enforcement of such promises.
The failure of the common law to enforce promises to benefit the pubPublished by Texas A&M Law Scholarship, 2022
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lic interest may flow from the same type of problem identified by Hardin in The Tragedy of the Commons. In The Tragedy, Hardin
described the effect of the ratio of the utility of the individual using
public resources compared to the fractional loss or burden the individual suffers from destruction of the public resource. The comparison of
utilities in the enforcement context presents a similar imbalance and
disincentive against protection of the public commons.
In the context of enforcement, the individual who would seek to
protect the public value by enforcing a promise made to the public
incurs significant enforcement costs. These include not only his time
but also his money in securing legal representation.1 5 Thus, the individual who considers taking up the burden of enforcement of a public
right incurs personal costs while the benefits received if plaintiff is
successful are public, as opposed to personal. In this context, the ratio
of cost to benefit presents the converse to the relationship noted by
Hardin in his chronicle of competition for public resources. The benefit side of the equation for the individual considering enforcement is
fractional while the cost side is entire. Remember, the cost to the
herdsman of depleting the commons was fractional while the benefit
to him was entire (a unit of +1). In the enforcement arena, the individual who considers acting to protect the public interest incurs an
entire cost of -1, but can anticipate only a fractional benefit in the
event his enforcement action prevails. The utility-cost ratio flips the
interests presented in the context of competition for resources. The
negative component is the cost of enforcing the obligation. The individual who wishes to enforce a contract in the public interest, or a law
protective of a public asset, must incur the full cost of enforcement but
only a fractional benefit of his investment, assuming
will reap
16
success.

To paraphrase Hardin: As a rational being, one considering enforcement of a promise made to protect a public benefit explicitly or
implicitly asks himself: "What is the utility to me of protecting the
rights of the public?" 17 Because the individual incurs all of the costs
15. The individual may also incur the cost represented by the risk that he may be
attacked personally for his advocacy on behalf of the public. See, e.g., John C. Barker,
Common-Law and Statutory Solutions to the Problem of SLAPPs, 26 Loy. L.A. L.
REV. 395 (1993); Phillip S. Berry, The "Environmental" SLAPP, in ALI-ABA
COURSE OF STUDY MATERIALS: SLAPPs: STRATEGIC LAWSUITS AGAINST PUBLIC
PARTICIPATION IN GOVERNMENT 61 (1994); Robert R. Kuehn, Shooting the Messenger: The Ethics of Attacks on Environmental Representation, 26 HARV. ENVTL. L.
REV. 417 (2002) (noting the personal risks to individuals who bring environmental
suits); Jennifer E. Sills, Comment, SLAPPs (Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation): How Can the Legal System Eliminate Their Appeal?, 25 CONN. L. REV. 547
(1993).
16. In some cases, the enforcing party is a public interest group. Individual members of the group share a fractional cost of enforcement. The group bears the full
costs and receives a fractional gain if its suit is ultimately successful.
17. Hardin, supra note 8, at 1244.
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of enforcement, the negative utility is nearly -1. The positive component is a function of the benefit of securing the promise for the public.
Because, however, the effects of this benefit are shared by all members of society, the positive utility for the individual decision-maker
considering an action in enforcement is only a fraction of +1.18 Hardin demonstrated that the individual's utility of overuse of the commons makes overuse inevitable. In the same way, the costs of
enforcement make under-enforcement of the law virtually inevitable.
The benefit of enforcement to the individual is outweighed by cost of
enforcement imposed on the individual. The cost-benefit ratio thus
militates against investment by the individual on behalf of the group.
This analysis makes clear the unlikely nature of enforcement of contractual commitments to benefit the public. Indeed, considering the
disincentives to bringing suit, the role that citizen suits have played in
prompting judicial review of violations of environmental laws is
remarkable. 9
2.

Performance of Promises for a Public Benefit

The incentive structure applicable to the promissor who makes a
promise to protect a public benefit such as a wetland makes performance unlikely. Absent effective enforcement, contractual commitments to preserve the common good are ineffective. Breaches by
developers and others who make promises to protect the public interest flow from the same type of problem identified by Hardin in The
Tragedy of the Commons. Hardin described the effect of the ratio of
the utility of the individual using public resources compared to the
fractional loss or burden the individual suffers from destruction of the
public resource.
Likewise, the comparison of utilities of the developer's decision to
perform or breach promises to the public presents a similar problem.
In the context of this decision, the individual promissor may have a
sense of duty to the public and may even genuinely desire to benefit
the public value. Nevertheless, his own self-interest in gaining a benefit at the lowest cost militates against performance. He will be investing his own money to secure the benefit for the public. Certainly he
owes the benefit as the corollary to the gain he received under the
contract. Nonetheless, if he can secure the gain without the cost then,
as a rational actor, that is the logical choice. Like the herdsman in
Hardin's story, the individual developer who promises a public good
considers his own self-interest. In deciding whether to breach or perform a contract for the public good, the developer will note that by
18. Id.
19. See, e.g., James R. May, Now More Than Ever: Trends in Environmental Citizen Suits at 30, 10 WIDENER L. REV. 1, 3 (2003) (reporting the rise of citizens suits,
including suits by "nontraditional citizens, including companies, landowners, developers, industry, and, ever more frequently, states and faith-based organizations").
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performing he obtains only a fractional gain while incurring the entire
cost of performance. The developer is also a rational being seeking to
maximize gain. His calculation of the utility of performing his contract includes a negative and a positive component. The positive component of performing his promise to establish a wetland is fractional.
It is the function of the incremental value obtained by the addition of
wetland to the public commons. As a member of the public, the developer attains the fractional benefit of protecting the public commons. The beneficial effect of protecting the public commons is
shared with all the users of the commons. Thus, the benefit is only a
fraction of +1. This fractional benefit to the developer as a member of
society is outweighed by the personal cost to him of performing the
contract, however. The negative component is the full cost of implementing the wetland mitigation. Because the developer incurs all the
costs of performance, the negative utility of performing is nearly -1.
Thus, the developer is unlikely to perform his promise unless he is
convinced that he will suffer consequences from his breach. If the
developer knows of the unlikely nature of enforcement, this heightens
the likelihood of breach. The ratio of cost to benefit to the developer
leads to the likely conclusion to breach.
3.

Other Enforcement Problems in the Context of
Promises for a Public Benefit

The foregoing analysis of the performance and enforcement of
promises to benefit the public demonstrates two dismal truths. First,
negative consequences to a breaching developer are unlikely because
enforcement actions by representatives of the public are unlikely.
Second, because enforcement is unlikely and the burdens of performance outweigh the benefits, performance is also unlikely. Setting
aside the incentive problems discussed above, other enforcement issues present obstacles to securing benefits promised to the public.
These can be seen by scrutinizing two other dynamics at work in this
area: (1) enforcement by agencies as representatives of the public and
(2) limitations on citizen enforcement.
a.

Limitations of Agency Resources and the Use of Contract Law

The reality that agencies often lack sufficient resources to fully enforce the thousands of commitments they secure is established by
other scholarship.2" In the case of enforcement and monitoring of
wetlands mitigation and conservation easements, for example, the in20. See, e.g., Richard N.L. Andrews, Long-Range Planningin Environmental and
Health Regulatory Agencies, 20 ECOLOGY L.Q. 515 (1993) (noting vulnerability of
agencies to organizational failure by capture "bureaucratic imperialism" and turf
struggles, inertia, and other problems); Patricia M. Wald, Regulation at Risk: Are
Courts Part of the Solution or Most of the Problem?, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 621, 625-29
(1994) (identifying burdens of judicial oversight and shortfalls in agency efficiency).
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dividual agency employee who monitors the commons incurs a unit of
cost for his efforts but is repaid with only a fractional gain-because
he has no particular benefit from the successful project. Agencies recognize the difficulty of monitoring promises in the public interest.
The Army NEPA regulation defines monitoring as either enforcement monitoring or effectiveness monitoring. Enforcement monitoring is basically designed to ensure that mechanisms are built into
contracts and agreements with those entities that will actually perform the mitigation. An example of enforcement monitoring is a
penalty clause written into a contract for the performance of mitigation measures. This form of enforcement is important, considering
that much of the Department of Defense's environmental
work is
21
actually performed by contract with private entities.
Similarly, the agencies charged with oversight of the project (Corps
of Engineers and EPA) experience incentives and disincentives in
their work. Diminished resources for monitoring and overwhelming
demands on the time of individuals in these agencies affect the efforts
they invest in past deals as opposed to future deals. Incentives for
agency personnel to invest time in monitoring are minimal. Shifts in
policy judgments and initiatives by different administrations, capture
of agency policy by regulated industry groups, and other difficulties of
agency enforcement are the subject of a substantial body of empirical
study and scholarly inquiry. 22 Such effects heighten the need for effective enforcement of laws by citizens.
b.

Barriers to Citizen Enforcement

Legal doctrines impose additional limitations on the members of
the public to enforce commitments to the public. For example, the
purpose of conservation easements is generally to preserve a benefit
for the public. Nevertheless, the right to enforce such easements is
typically restricted to charitable institutions or public officials.2 3 Most
21. Lieutenant Colonel Tozzi, Mitigation Measures in Analyses Under the National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), ARMY LAW. 44, 46-47 (Sept. 2002) (footnotes
omitted).
22. See, e.g., John D. Echeverria & Julie B. Kaplan, Poisonous Procedural "Reform": In Defense of Environmental Right-to-Know, 12 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 579,
589 (2003) (noting a "tendency over time for regulatory agencies to turn into servants
of the interests they are supposed to be regulating"); Michael I. Jeffery, Intervenor
Funding as the Key to Effective Citizen Participationin Environmental Decision-Making: Putting the People Back into the Picture, 19 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 643, 649
(2002) (discussing citizen claims under Administrative Procedures Act); Bradley C.
Karkkainen, Toward a Smarter NEPA: Monitoring and Managing Government's Environmental Performance, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 903, 908 (2002) (suggesting use of
NEPA to monitor agency performance and counteract agency capture); Bradford C.
Mank, Superfund Contractorsand Agency Capture, 2 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 34 (1993);
Matthew D. Zinn, Policing Environmental Regulatory Enforcement: Cooperation,
Capture, and Citizen Suits, 21 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 81 (2002).
23. See Adam E. Draper, Comment, Conservation Easements: Now More Than
Ever-Overcoming Obstacles to Protect Private Lands, 34 ENVTL. L. 247, 249 (2004).
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statutory provisions indicate that enforcement may be brought by a
charitable organization named in the easement.24 The development of
the law of conservation easements has not provided significant enforcement rights to citizens. 25 Some statutes provide a basis for recognizing the right of members of the public to enforce a conservation
easement. For example, the Court of Appeals in Tennessee reversed a
chancellor's decision that limited the right to enforce a conservation
easement to the government entity named in the easement. 26 In Tennesee Environmental Council, Inc. v. Bright Par 3 Assocs., the court
held that 27any citizen of the state of Tennessee could enforce the
easement.

Despite enforcement difficulties, the existence of federal and state
citizen suit provisions are a clear indication of the congressional recognition of the public as stakeholder in environmental and natural resource assets. Congress clearly recognized the problem of

enforcement in the environmental area. For example, most federal
and many state environmental statutes include citizen suit provisions. 28 By the creation of such citizen suit provisions, Congress and
state legislators enhanced the likelihood of enforcement and, as a consequence, enhanced compliance with environmental laws. Authoriza-

tions of citizen suits acknowledged the pervasiveness of activities that
can result in pollution and the overwhelming task of enforcement
24. See, e.g., ALA. CODE §§ 35-18-1, 35-18-3(a) (Supp. 2004); ALASKA STAT.
§§ 34.17.020(a), 34.17.060 (LEXIS 2004); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 33-271, 33273(A) (West 2000); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 15-20-402, 15-20-409(a) (LEXIS 2003);
CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 815, 815.3, 815.7 (West 1982 & Supp. 2005); COLO. REV. STAT.
§§ 38-30.5-104(2), 38-30.5-108 (2004); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 7, §§ 6901, 6903(a) (2001);
D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 42-201, 42-203(a) (2001); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 704.06 (West 2000);
GA. CODE ANN. §§ 44-10-2, 44-10-4(a) (2002); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 66-9-305(a), 669-307 (2004); TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. §§ 183.001, 183.003(a) (Vernon 2001);
UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 57-18-3, 57-18-6 (2000); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 10.1-1009, 10.1-1013
(Michie 1998); W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 20-12-3, 20-12-5(a) (Michie 2002); Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 700.40(1), (3) (West 2001).
25. See Michael R. Eitel, Comment, Wyoming's Trepidation Toward Conservation
Easement Legislation:A Look at Two Issues Troubling the Wyoming State Legislature,
4 Wyo. L. REV. 57 (2004) (examining both common law and statutory conservation
easements and focusing development of law of conservation easements in Wyoming);
Melissa K. Thompson & Jessica E. Jay, An Examination of Court Opinions on the
Enforcement and Defense of Conservation Easements and Other Conservation and
Preservation Tools: Themes and Approaches to Date, 78 DENV. U.L. REV. 373 (2000)
(noting general lack of success of third party enforcement of easements). See generally Ian Bowles, David Downes, Dana Clark & Marianne Gudrin-McManus, Economic Incentives and Legal Tools for Private Sector Conservation, 8 DUKE ENVTL. L.
& POL'Y F. 209 (1997) (studying programs in other countries).
26. See Tenn. Envtl. Council, Inc. v. Bright Par 3 Assocs., No. E2003-01982-COAR3-CV, 2004 WL 419720, at *1 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 8, 2004).
27. Id.
28. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a) (2000) (authorizing citizen suits against RCRA
violators and against agencies for failure to fulfill a nondiscretionary duty under
RCRA); 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (2000) (authorizing citizen suits under the Clean Air Act
against agencies and polluters).
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placed on regulatory agencies. Policing all potential polluting activity

is virtually impossible. Accordingly, citizen suits provisions provide
an important supplement to the enforcement of state and federal
agencies. The provisions also inherently recognize that the public has
a real stake in policing and reducing the impacts of pollution and
other hazards on natural resources and the environment. Citizens
may bring actions against individuals, corporations, other entities, and
governmental agencies, including the agencies that administer the environmental statutes.2 9 In most cases, citizens must provide notice to

the appropriate agency before commencing suit against the agency or
others.3" Citizens seeking to enforce federal mandates under citizen

suit provisions have met a variety of legal hurdles, including a rigorous
and malleable standing tests and narrow reading of citizen suit statutory provisions. 31 Although the legal issue of enforcement of the conditions of Section 404 permits is arguably not a settled question,32

courts have rejected the citizen suits seeking to enforce conditions of
permits.3 3
Because of the pervasive nature of the use of public resources and

the pollution of the public commons, Congress noted the limited nature of agency resources to enforce environmental laws. It thus
sought to enhance enforcement by the private attorney general concept. Although Congress sought to empower members of the public

to act as a private attorney general in enforcing environmental laws,
the likelihood of enforcement is reduced by the Supreme Court's use
29. See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)(1) (2000).
30. See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)(2).
31. See, e.g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 571-78 (1992) (holding
that for standing a plaintiff must show a concrete injury in fact with a fairly traceable
causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of and that a
favorable decision will likely redress the injury); see also David Milton Whalin, The
Polluter's Court: Expanding Polluter Rights While Limiting Pollutee Rights, 12 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 329 (2001) (surveying barriers to citizen suits).
32. See WILLIAM L. WANT, LAW OF WETLANDS REGULATION § 8:11 (2004) (asserting that the Clean Water Act allows suits against private violators of § 404);
Michael D. Montgomery, Note, Raising the Level of Compliance with the Clean Water
Act by Utilizing Citizens and the Broad Disseminationof Information to Enhance Civil
Enforcement of the Act, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 533, 540-42 (1999).
33. See Pres. Endangered Areas of Cobb's History, Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of
Eng'rs, 87 F.3d 1242, 1250 (11th Cir. 1996) (rejecting plaintiffs' argument that the
Clean Water Act's citizen suit provision applies to § 404, on the basis that the Supreme Court has stressed the limited role of courts in interpreting a statute); N.W.
Envtl. Def. Ctr. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 118 F. Supp. 2d 1115 (D. Or. 2000)
(holding Clean Water Act does not authorize citizen suit against private defendants,
and sovereign immunity protects Corps against citizen suit under CWA); Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. Adamkus, 936 F. Supp. 435 (W.D. Mich. 1996) (rejecting plaintiff's claim
that failure of EPA to respond to public comment was not reviewable under Administrative Procedure Act); see also Phillip M. Bender, Slowing the Net Loss of Wetlands:
Citizen Suit Enforcement of Clean Water Act § 404 Permit Violations, 27 ENVTL. L. 245
(1997) (presenting rationale for supplementary role of citizen suits under § 505 to
increase compliance with § 404 permits).
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of standing to limit access to the courts to achieve such enforcement,
as well as the inherent incentives and disincentives discussed above.3 4

III.

THE PUBLIC PURPOSE OF LAW

The law establishes and mediates the rights of individuals vis a vis
each other and vis a vis society. The transcendent purpose of the law
is the protection of society as a whole and the individual members of
society.35 Both statutes and the common law seek to minimize unreasonable risks posed by self-interested rational action. Tort law also

arises from strong public norms. Evidence of the transcendent importance of the public good is found in all areas of law. Criminal law
presents norms of such importance that the law is willing to deprive
violators of property, liberty, and even life to punish and minimize
such conduct. The strength of these norms is clear from the fact that

the law will impose punitive damages on the tortfeasor whose conduct
is deemed outrageous.3 6 Although contract law may present weaker

norms than criminal or tort law, the public purpose of the private ordering of contract law is clear from the effects of contract enforce-

ment. Providing enforcement for the breach of private promises
creates an incentive for the parties to perform their promises because
society takes such promises seriously and will give effect to the
promises when the promisor breaches.3 7 This public benefit of private
contracts between individuals is significant to society. The benefits

that inhere in promises made to governmental agencies to protect the
public good are also of great significance. Nevertheless, such contracts lack the basic enforcement default of ordinary contracts between individuals. The diffuse nature of the benefit and the
34. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 571-74.
35. This purpose is clearest in criminal law where the public norms protected are
strongest. It is arguably weakest in contract law where the norms function loosely to
set the stage for private ordering. Nonetheless, social ordering is an undeniable goal
of contract law. This social ordering can be described as the goal of certainty of obligation protected by contract law.
36. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908 (1979).
(1) Punitive damages are damages, other than compensatory or nominal
damages, awarded against a person to punish him for his outrageous
conduct and to deter him and others like him from similar conduct in the
future.
(2) Punitive damages may be awarded for conduct that is outrageous, because of the defendant's evil motive or his reckless indifference to the
rights of others. In assessing punitive damages, the trier of fact can
properly consider the character of the defendant's act, the nature and
extent of the harm to the plaintiff that the defendant caused or intended
to cause and the wealth of the defendant.
Id.
37. Additionally, courts may apply significant sanctions for breach of contract, and
they may refuse enforcement of a contract on the ground that the contract violates
public policy.
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unlikelihood of enforcement by either the agency or individuals make
the achievement of the protection less likely.
A.

Contract Enforcement in Private Contracts and Public Contracts

The public purpose in enforcing contracts is clear. A society in
which contracts are secure is one in which markets flourish, maximizing wealth as well as robust exchanges. Society's desire for certainty
of obligation comes from the need of a commercial society to encourage contracts for future performance as opposed to instantaneous
transfers. Thus, to make parties secure in contracting, the law enforces promises by respecting the allocated benefit of the deal. By
recognizing the right to expectancy damages for a party injured by a
breach, contract law creates incentives for people to make promises of
future performance. In the same way, contract law creates incentive
for people to enforce promises. Its default principle of expectancy
damages secures to the injured party the right to substitution damages, neutralizing to a significant extent the effects of breach and lessening to a significant extent the likelihood of breach. Contract law
draws on the mechanism of commitment to further the public good
through contracting. Thus, individuals in society can reasonably rely
on contractual commitments. 38 The payoff for society is not the enhanced wealth of a particular transaction, but rather, the reliability of
commitment and the enhanced wealth that flows from flourishing
markets.
When a private party to a contract breaches his obligation to another, the law depends on the injured party to enforce his own rights,
and thus to protect not only his own interest, but also the incentives of
all to contract and to perform their contractual commitments. In this
way, each lawsuit to enforce a contract is a citizen suit for the benefit
of society to re-establish the certainty of contractual commitment. If
Seller refuses to deliver the goods contracted for, the injured party
buyer (Buyer) has the right to obtain the goods from another seller
(cover) and sue for damages based on the cover price.39 If Buyer covers, he obtains substitute goods at the original price set by the contract
38. As every law graduate should know, "expectation" is not a synonym for "expected profit." The term "expectancy" refers to the contract principle that enforcement of a contract will give the injured party damages that put him in the place he
would have been in had the contract been performed. This measure does not speak to
what was "expected" by the injured party at the time of contracting, but rather, what
is necessary based on the market to put him in the position of performance at the time
set for performance.
39. The measure of damages often does not fully compensate injured party because it fails to include the transaction costs of collecting damages. For example, the
injured party must pay for the attorney's fees incurred as a result of pursuing damages
against the breaching party. Thus, as a practical matter the UCC regime under-compensates plaintiffs. Other works establish the failure of the UCC measure to compensate injured party buyer fully.
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under UCC 2-712. Buyer also has the option of suing under UCC 2713 for theoretical cover. The breaching party must also take the risk
that the injured party's rights under the contract may include specific
performance. Thus, the breaching party (here the Seller) incurs the
risk that the market conditions that influenced his desire to be free of
the contract may also affect injured party's access to substitute goods.
When a party considers breach in the context of private agreements,
he faces a strong likelihood of enforcement. This is because the injured party incurs the losses of the breach directly and individually.
Unlike Hardin's herdsman and unlike the individual seeking to enforce a public benefit, the gain to the injured party who enforces a
private contract is not fractional. The injured party receives the benefit of the bargain, at least as a theoretical matter.4n Thus, the injured
party is a good surrogate for the public interest in contracting. The
likelihood that the breaching party, the Seller, will profit from the
breach is small. Additionally, at the time Seller assesses his interests
in performing or breaching, he cannot fully know the extent of damages to the injured party. This is because the UCC protects the injured party's bargain by the expectancy measure and provides the
injured party time to consider whether to cover or seek theoretical
damages. Contract rules thus protect not only the injured party but
also the general incentives of parties to enter contracts. The tragedy
of the commons is not present because the only effect on the commons is the derivative effect from private enforcement. Thus, contract
law draws on the mechanism of commitment to protect the public
good of contracting. To make parties secure in contracting, the law
enforces promises by respecting the allocated benefit of the deal.
In this way, contract law encourages the parties to enter contracts.
The advantage 'or "take" to the contracting parties is the surplus of
value (each party values the exchanged performance he receives more
than the exchanged performance renders). The advantage or "take"
of the contract for society is the surplus of value created by the transaction and in the market at large by increased economic activity that
results from giving individuals sufficient security to make contracts for
future performance. 4 ' Contract law protects individual rights in
promises of future exchanges. In doing so, it protects society's interest
in encouraging contracts. The benefit to the public is diffuse and derivative from the benefit to the individual plaintiff who obtains enforcement of the private agreement. The derivative nature of this
benefit does not mean that it is not a significant benefit to the public.
40. Scholars note that the plaintiff often is under-compensated for damages. See
e.g., Daniel A. Farber, Reassessing the Economic Efficiency of Compensatory Damagesfor Breach of Contract,66 VA. L. REV. 1443, 1443-48 (1980); Alan Schwartz, The
Case for Specific Performance, 89 YALE L.J. 271, 274-78 (1979).
41. Specific performance secures transfer of the property itself when expectancy
cannot be adequately protected by a substitute.
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The individual who sues to protect his own immediate interest also
protects the group interest in contracting and the strong economy that
contracting encourages. Enforcement of private contract produces a
derivative effect of belief in the power of contracts and, thus, a robust
economy. Promises directly to benefit the public good may present an
equally significant impact on the public good, such as the promise to
create a wetland, or perhaps even a more direct impact on the public
good. Nevertheless, such promises for the public good receive less
protection than private contracts and are thus less likely to be performed or enforced. 2
B.

Protection of the Public Good

The foundational importance of a livable environment means that
the public good is directly implicated in environmental issues. In
cases where individuals make promises to the public as a whole, the
public purpose is real and, in a sense, of greater significance than contracts between two individuals. Nevertheless, the promise to the public is less likely to be enforced and less likely to be performed than
promises between two individuals. The personal interest of any member of the public in the public promise is limited. Additionally, enforcement mechanisms are diluted in the context of individual action
to address breaches to the public trust. Part of the statutory fix in this
area is the use of contracts between private parties and governmental
entities for the protection of the environment and natural resources.
Both common law and statutory laws seek to protect the public
good.4 3 Nevertheless, protection of the public good (the commons)
seems to present difficulties in excess of the difficulties of protecting
individual interests through individual contracts. Environmental law
provides a literal example of the public good as the commons. The
canon of environmental laws of the United States seeks to further that
purpose. Both federal law and federal statutes rely on the public interest in natural resources, recognizing members of the public as
42. It may be that because the benefit to the individual actor is less direct, the law
respects his right to speak for the group with skepticism and thus gives less protection
for the individual actor.
43. Numerous authorities declare or imply the principle of the public interest in
the common law and statutes. Principles of international human rights, statutes, and
the constitutions of some states declare the right of individuals to a livable environment. See, e.g., John L. Horwich, Montana's Constitutional Environmental Quality
Provisions:Self-Execution or Self Delusion?, 57 MoNr. L. REv. 323 (1996).
[Montana's] new constitution proclaimed that all persons have an inalienable right to a clean and healthful environment; it obligated the state and
each person to maintain and improve that clean and healthful environment
for present and future generations; and it pledged to protect the environment from degradation and unreasonable depletion.
Id. at 323-24 (footnotes omitted) (citing MONT. CONST. art. II § 3, IX § 1).
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stakeholders in public waters and other resources.4 4 The significance
of the public interest is particularly clear in the environmental area
because it is clear that humans and other forms of life depend on the
commons of air, water, and soil for their existence. Statutory law provides dramatic sanctions for violation of the laws intended to protect
the environment and the public.
The enforcement component of the laws is crucial to furtherance of
the purpose of those laws. In the environmental area, enforcement is
expressly provided within the laws. Environmental laws grant enforcement power to the public agencies and, additionally to individuals as representatives of the public through citizen suits. Most federal
environmental acts empower citizens to sue individual violators of the
acts and, additionally, governmental agencies that fail to fulfill
mandatory duties under the acts. Despite the express declaration of
the right to private citizen suits in such statutes, however, enforcement
of the contracts for the public good is less likely than enforcement of
purely private agreements because the benefit of such enforcement is
outweighed by the cost of enforcement.
Before it issues a permit for development, the Corps must assess the
public interest in dedicating wetland resources to the proposed project, even when the developer owns the wetlands areas. The interlocking nature of environmental laws and private agreement is clear.
For example, easements often refer to Section 404 of the Clean Water
Act as recognition of the public interest and to memorialize the fact
that a developer is seeking a permit from the United States Army
Corps of Engineers for activities affecting the waters of the United
States. Parties seeking to develop natural areas that fall within the
jurisdiction of the Clean Water Act frequently enter conservation
easements and other contracts as part of the Section 404 permit process. Nevertheless, mechanisms for protecting the public commons
are vulnerable to breach without remedy. For example, if the wetland
is not maintained, the wildlife is not protected, the forest is cut in violation of a provision of a conservation easement, a river is dammed, a
lake is drained or polluted, or any number of other degradations of
the environment violate commitments made by private parties to
agencies and by agencies to each other. A public resource is dimin44. See I11.Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892); Nat'l Audubon Soc'y v.
Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709 (Cal. 1983). For a look at the history of the Mono Lake
case and insights into the lessons of environmental activism, see Craig Anthony
(Tony) Arnold, Working Out an Environmental Ethic: Anniversary Lessons from
Mono Lake, 4 Wyo. L. REV. 1 (2004); Craig Anthony (Tony) Arnold & Leigh A.
Jewell, Litigation's Bounded Effectiveness and the Real Public Trust Doctrine: The Aftermath of the Mono Lake Case, 8 HASTINGS W.-Nw. J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 1 (2001);
Michael C. Blumm & Thea Schwartz, Mono Lake and the Evolving Public Trust in
Western Water, 37 ARIz. L. REV. 701 (1995); Cynthia L. Koehler, Water Rights and the
Public Trust Doctrine:Resolution of the Mono Lake Controversy, 22 ECOLOGY L.Q.
541 (1995).
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ished or destroyed, and, thus, the public interest is eroded. This erosion often will have more dramatic consequences than the breach of
one commercial contract. Such commercial contracts are more likely
to be enforced, however, because of the direct benefit of enforcement
to the injured party. While the beneficial public effect of the contract
may be more localized than promises to benefit the public commons, a
breach of public commitments is less likely to be enforced than the
ordinary contract. It fits Hardin's model of incentives and disincentives. Possible solutions to the problem such as third party beneficiary
law and broader rights under citizen suits provisions of environmental
laws. 45 Some examples of enforcement of contract obligations undertaken in permits or other contracts with government agencies exist.4 6
Such cases are rare, however, and this line of enforcement seems to be
largely overlooked. Further analysis of strategies and incentives is
essential to understand and secure the public benefits bargained for in
agency contracts on behalf of the public.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The significance of the public interest in maintaining a livable environment provides a realistic context for studying the public good in
contractual commitments to the public. This Article explores the disjuncture between enforcement of ordinary contract obligations between individuals and contracts entered by agencies as representative
of the public. Numerous authorities declare or imply the principle of
the public interest in statutes and in the common law. Wetlands mitigation is merely one example of the type of contract obligations undertaken by individuals as necessary to secure some benefit such as a
permit to develop wetlands. 47 Absent a realistic possibility of enforcement, all commitments are essentially symbolic in nature. This truth
relates to contracts entered with agencies as representatives of the
public as well as to other commitments and other laws. Private con45. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 304 (1993) (noting enforceability of promises by third party beneficiaries); see also Ratzlaff v. Franz Foods, 468
S.W.2d 239 (Ark. 1971). For an excellent analysis of third party beneficiary law in the
context of public rights, see Justin Massey, Applying the Third Party Beneficiary Theory of Contracts to Enforce Clean Water Act section 404 Permits:A California Case
Study, 18 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 129 (2003) (assessing California third party beneficiary law and applying it to the Section 404 context), and Anthony Jon Waters, The
Property in the Promise: A Study of the Third Party Beneficiary Rule, 98 HARV. L.
REV. 1109 (1985) (noting the "link between the third party beneficiary rule and public
law" and exploring private actions to secure "an individual's access to some beneficial
interest" in a variety of statutory and contract contexts).
46. See, e.g., Zigas v. Superior Court, 174 Cal. Rptr. 806 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981)
(holding that the tenants of the defendant landlord, who had contracted with HUD to
secure a federally insured mortgage, had standing as third party beneficiaries to bring
an action alleging that the landlord was charging excessive rent in violation of the
contract between the landlord and HUD).
47. The entire canon of environmental laws of the United States seeks to further
that purpose.
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tract law presents a realistic regime of enforcement because of the
direct injury from a breach and the high likelihood of enforcement by
the injured party. The contracts entered by agencies for wetlands mitigation and other public benefits have the direct goal of securing a
benefit for the public and in the public interest.
Enforcement of typical contracts between individuals is clearer and
more likely than enforcement of promises to benefit the public interest. The dependence of our system of justice on agencies to enforce
promises made to the public leaves the public interest vulnerable to
fluctuating policy judgments by the administration in power and the
problem of overburdened regulatory agencies and individual agency
employees who lack the time to pursue enforcement of obligations to
the public. Although the mandates of environmental laws and the citizen suit provisions included in those laws provide legal recognition of
the rights of the public, such recognition is limited to symbolic significance when citizen suits are restricted and agency resources are not
equal to the task of consistent enforcement. Use of contract law to
remedy the structural problems of inadequate remedies at law may
serve as a supplement to current enforcement through agency action.
Such a response has drawbacks and uncertainties. Notable among the
drawbacks is the fact that the fix depends on vigilance and action by
members of the public and the likelihood that rational actors will not
pursue such actions when the benefit to them is merely the benefit to
them as members of the public rather than as individuals. The analysis presented in this Article suggests that the contractual commitments
in agency documents may produce more powerful protection of the
public interest if they include express contractual provisions for public
participation and enforcement.
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